Outcomes of the Transition Process in Central and Eastern Europe: The Roles of Culture and Society in Adopting Democratic Capitalism by Lee, Brian
Inquiry: The University of Arkansas Undergraduate Research
Journal
Volume 9 Article 5
Fall 2008
Outcomes of the Transition Process in Central and
Eastern Europe: The Roles of Culture and Society
in Adopting Democratic Capitalism
Brian Lee
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/inquiry
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Inquiry: The University of
Arkansas Undergraduate Research Journal by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lee, Brian (2008) "Outcomes of the Transition Process in Central and Eastern Europe: The Roles of Culture and Society in Adopting
Democratic Capitalism," Inquiry: The University of Arkansas Undergraduate Research Journal: Vol. 9 , Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/inquiry/vol9/iss1/5
ECONOMICS: Brian Lee 5 
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ROLES OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN ADOPTING DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM 
By Brian Lee 
Department of Finance 
Faculty Mentor: David E. R. Gay 
Department of Finance 
Abstract 
In this paper, the author explores the reasons why some 
states have achieved higher levels of progress in transitioning 
from a communist system to a system rooted in democratic 
capitalism. Unlike the majority of scholars, though, he does 
not fault any one government's policies or the reform path 
chosen for a country's success or supposed failure along the 
way. Instead, the author concludes that the outcome of the 
transition process is dependent upon the interaction between 
the new formal institutions being adopted and the prevailing 
informal societal institutions and rules found throughout 
the region. If the formal institutions are in harmony with the 
informal institutions, then transition should occur relatively 
smoothly. Transaction costs will be lower, and individuals 
will be encouraged to engage in economic activity, producing 
wealth. 
Using a panel growth regression and a data sample drawn 
from 20 transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
over the period 1990-2005, the author empirically tests 
the validity of this hypothesis. In order to measure whether 
the interaction between the new formal institutions and the 
informal institutions has a significant impact on economic 
growth in each sample country, he incorporates each state's 
score for overall economic freedom from the Heritage 
Foundation's 2006 Index of Economic Freedom, as well as 
its score for political rights and civil liberties from Freedom 
House. The more in tune a country's informal rules are with 
the formal rules being adopted- those of a market economy 
and pluralistic system of government- the better the scores it 
is awarded from each organi::.ation. 
The results provide evidence in support of the author's 
hypothesis. Even though the impact of political rights and civil 
liberties is inconclusive, the regression estimation does show 
that the level of economic freedom enjoyed by the citizens of a 
country does significantly affect levels of GDP, meaning that 
greater levels of success along the path towards democracy 
and a market-based economy in Central and Eastern Europe 
can be attributed to each country's informal institutions. The 
more these are in tune with the fomzal rules being adopted, 
the quicker citi::.ens in a country are able to adapt to the new 
institutions, allowing for a democratic, capitalist system to take 
root and flourish. 
I. Introduction 
The end of Communism in Central and Eastern 
Europe was a watershed event of the late 20th century. The 
authoritarian regimes of the region had succumbed to domestic 
pressures and relinquished their monopoly on power, and 
nearly overnight approximately 300 million Europeans were 
presented with the opportunity to choose their political and 
economic systems anew. Where should they begin? What 
was important? Where should they look for guidance and 
assistance? The citizens of each country had to answer these 
simple, yet crucial questions. In response, academics of all 
disciplines and convictions, governments, and international 
organizations attempted to provide guidance and advice on the 
steps of the reform process. 
II. Success in the Transition Process- The Interaction Thesis 
A small group of economists comprised mainly of Enrico 
Colombatto, Jan Svejnar, Jan Winiecki, and Svetozar Pejovich, 
attributes the success of the transition process to whether or 
not the new market system, with its new and different rules and 
values, is adaptable to the culture and history of the country in 
question. As Svetozar Pejovich (2003) states: 
Transition means institutional restructuring. Since formal 
rules are not a policy variable, transition has to mean 
the enactment of new formal rules: that is, constitutions, 
statutes, common law precedents, and/or governmental 
regulations. The results of transition then depend on the 
interaction of new formal and prevailing informal rules. 
Of course, the rules do not interact. Individuals do. New 
formal rules create new incentives and opportunities for 
human interactions. How individuals react to those new 
opportunities for exchange depends on how they perceive 
them. And how individuals perceive new opportunities 
depend on the prevailing culture. 
In other words. the issue on which the success of the 
transition process actually hinges is not the technical aspects 
of reform or the numerous policies, but rather the transactions 
costs created by these reforms. costs which are defined as the 
cost incurred by an individual when engaging in economic 
activity. Transaction costs are indirectly related to the 
compatibility of these transition policies and the new market 
system with the history of the numerous populations in Central 
and Eastern Europe and the customs, traditions, and culture 
that grew out of this history. If the new formal institutions 
are in tune with the informal institutions, then the transition 
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should occur relatively smoothly because the transaction 
costs of conducting business are low and individuals will find 
it worthwhile to engage in economic activity and produce 
wealth. If the new formal institutions are not in tune with the 
informal institutions, then individuals will find that transactions 
costs are higher than before, which discourages them from 
conducting business and producing wealth. Therefore the 
question needing to be answered is whether the formal 
institutions being developed by the transition process and the 
values and behavior necessary for the proper functioning of 
these formal institutions agree with the informal institutions 
already in place in these countries (Colombatto and Macey 
1999, Pejovich 1997,2001,2003 and Winiecki 2000, 2004). 
A. The Interaction Thesis 
Svetozar Pejovich ( 1997) terms this phenomenon the 
interaction thesis, which states that, if the formal institutions 
are compatible with the informal institutions, then the 
incentives they create will tend to reinforce one another. As 
Pejovich (2003) later summarizes: 
When changes in formal rules are in harmony with the 
prevailing informal rules, the incentives they create will 
tend to reduce transaction costs and free some resources 
for the production of wealth. When new formal rules 
conflict with the prevailing informal rules, the incentive 
they create will raise transaction costs and reduce the 
production of wealth in the community. 
The interaction thesis describes the scenario that had been 
unfolding in Central and Eastern Europe for years. Following 
the events of 1989 and 1990, the new governments in this 
region undertook the process of building capitalism. with the 
guidance and strong support from the West. Almost overnight 
the formal institutions that had been in place during the 
communist era had been deemed obsolete. In their place a new 
set of rules and institutions based on those found in Western 
societies was installed. forming the new framework by which 
the people in the region would conduct business and interact 
amongst themselves and with the rest of the world. 
B. Outcomes of the Transition Process if the F omzal & 
Informal Institutions are Incompatible 
As Colombatto ( 200 l. 284) points out. ·· ... in the modem 
world. freedom is a secondary need. Security comes first." In 
the case of Central and Eastern Europe. such circumstances 
created the opportunity for the new system to be hijacked 
and run aground by those who wanted to use the political 
machinery for personal gain. This allowed members of the 
former nomenklatura and other rent-seekers to gain control 
of the new economic system and led to the development of a 
large informal economy or black market in some countries. 
Even though the emergence of practices such as the oli~rarchs 
in Russia or a similar business class in the Ukraine did little 
to promote the public welfare or the success of the transition 
process, the majority of society did not protest against such 
behavior because it provided a sense of security, which arose 
from being able to engage in transactions much in the same 
manner as they had for the past decades and even centuries. 
These transactions were not based on the type of trust that 
permitted the creation of an extended order in society, which 
was needed if the new formal rules were to produce the desired 
outcome. Instead, these economic transactions were based 
on one's reputation and the personal relationships found in 
the close-knit communities of Central and Eastern Europe 
(Colombatto 2001 and Pejovich 1997, 2003). 
The conflict between the new formal institutions and 
the region's informal institutions also led to the election of 
leaders who were able to undermine the reform process. Such 
leaders played on the fears of the populace, promising to 
provide security at a time when no one was certain as to the 
course economic and political reform would take. They were 
subsequently elected, but instead of promoting the aims of the 
transition process, these leaders sabotaged the entire process, 
effectively securing a monopoly on power for themselves and 
in doing so taking the newly-won political and civil freedoms 
away from the people. Vladimir Putin in Russia and Aleksandr 
Lukashenka are two examples of such leaders. This process 
was able to occur because only in a stable society, where 
people feel secure, can the exercise of freedom or personal 
economic interests become relevant. Until such a point has 
been reached, though, the desire for order and comfort takes 
precedence over any desire for freedom (Colombatto 200 I and 
Woodruff 2005). 
C. The Interaction Thesis and Central and Eastern 
Europe -A Summary 
The success of the transition process is not dependent on 
the technical steps taken during the reform process, rather on 
the interaction between the new formal institutions that are 
being transplanted and the informal institutions already present 
in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. While certain 
steps must be taken if the transition process is to result in a 
market-based economy and a state that is democratic in nature 
and upholds the rule of law, these steps have only a marginal 
impact on the eventual outcome of the reform process. They 
are merely steps in the reform process, necessary in that 
they are required to complete the transition from a socialist 
economy to a capitalistic one. However, these steps can take 
varying forms and the end result will still be the same. For 
example, one can look at the process of transforming an 
economy as similar to remodeling a house. Someone can desire 
to remodel the house and transform it from its original state for 
various reasons, and through this process. the house can gain 
an additional pair of new rooms or the house can be altered so 
that it receives a different outward appearance. Such changes 
are usually carried out for aesthetic, not practical reasons. 
Either the owner had grown tired of the outward appearance of 
the house or he believed that an addition was needed in order 
to allow for more occupants, etc. These changes are aesthetic, 
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in that the foundation of the house has not been altered; only 
its outward appearance has evolved. 
It is much like the process of a newly-elected government 
coming to power in Western Europe or the United States. 
The new government does not typically alter the political 
or economic institutions of the country; these institutions 
remain in place. but this does not necessarily mean that 
the government retains all of the policies of the previous 
government. It is allowed to pass laws and implement policy 
as it sees fit, according to its party doctrine and the promises 
supposedly made over the course of the campaign. The process 
of changing power within a system of government possesses 
many similarities with the process of remodeling a house 
after a new owner moves in. In both instances, the foundation 
of both the house and the system remains the same, only the 
appearance changes, in order to incorporate the preferences 
or policies of the new government or in this example, the 
preferences of the new owner. Such a process occurs regularly 
in Western societies. Power is exchanged peacefully within 
a system of government. and with this exchange of power, 
policies that have varying aims are implemented. but this does 
not mean that the foundation which the entire system is built 
upon has been altered. These governments must work within 
the institutional foundation of each country, a foundation that 
in the case of a \Vestern society means the procurement of civil 
liberties as well as the property rights system and legal system 
necessary for a market economy. For each country that adheres 
to such a system, the content and aims of its policies may differ 
due to the preferences of its populace, but the foundation on 
which the entire system rests remains unaltered. 
There are instances. though. that require one to rebuild 
the foundation of the house. not for aesthetic purposes, but 
in order to ensure that the structure will continue to remain 
in existence. This could be due to various reasons: erosion. a 
crack in the foundation, etc. In these circumstances, one would 
be required to either repair the foundation of the house to a 
large extent or rebuild the foundation in its entirety. Following 
the events of 1989 and 1990. the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe found themselves in such a situation. No 
longer would it prove adequate to simply change the exterior 
of its house or in this case. the policies and regulations of the 
state. The people demanded a change in the foundation of each 
country. No longer could the leaders of each country attempt 
to simply alter the communist system and simply improve the 
political environment and increase economic growth. Instead. 
the citizens of each country pushed for the foundation on 
which the state stood to be rebuilt. They insisted upon the right 
to political participation. a guarantee of civil liberties. and the 
right to make economic decisions based on their preferences. 
not those dictated to them from the Communist party and 
its apparatus. They demanded to live under a political and 
economic system similar to the system found in the Western 
world, but in order for such a system to be successfully 
transplanted the new formal rules would have to be in tune 
with the informal rules that were already present throughout 
the region. 
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Such a transition demanded more than simple adherence 
to a certain transition model or reform plan; it required the 
people of each country to be in a position to adapt to the new 
formal rules that were being exogenously "forced" upon 
them. The technical elements of the reform process did not 
determine the ultimate outcome; rather they served simply as 
a means to an end. Ultimately, the success of the transition 
process in each country depended upon whether the populace 
was able to adapt to the new formal institutions. If these new 
formal rules were successfully adopted then the foundation of 
the new market system would be able to stand tirm, allowing 
for stable economic growth. If not successfully adopted, then 
the results would be different- economic growth would be 
volatile and the size of the informal economy would tend 
to increase as citizens began conducting business based on 
reputation and personal relationships. forgoing the voluntary 
exchanges with strangers that allow a capitalistic economy to 
operate optimally. In the case of Central and Eastern Europe, 
such results would derail the transition process as the people in 
each country reverted to methods of conducting economic and 
political affairs that might provide comfort and security, but 
were not compatible with the methods of a society supportive 
of a thriving market economy. 
III. Support for the Interaction Thesis 
The successful transition from a communist system 
to a democratic government and an economy based on the 
market was dependent upon the interaction between the new 
formal rules being adopted and the informal ones already in 
place in each country throughout Central and Eastern Europe 
(Colombatto and Macey 1999; Pejovich 1997,2001,2003: 
Winiecki 2000, 2004: and Zweynert and Goldschmidt 2006). 
Hayek ( 1988) maintains that exposure to the West and its 
notion of an extended order encourages the development of 
the individual and promotes the self-serving decision-making 
process that underlies a capitalist system. According to the 
interaction argument. countries with this exposure were 
able to put in place a system of credible and secure property 
rights with its supporting institutions of a constitution, an 
independent judiciary. and freedom of contracts. This historical 
connection allowed the new market economy to take root 
quickly and begin to thrive within a relatively short time period 
as the population of these countries felt comfortable to engage 
in voluntary exchanges in the marketplace. fueling economic 
growth. On the other hand. countries lacking prior contact with 
the West and its traditions and practices had a more difficult 
time adopting the formal institutions necessary for a properly 
functioning market economy. In these cases. the transition to 
a capitalistic economy was derailed at an early stage. allowing 
for either strong-armed rulers or rent-seekers to stall both the 
economic and political transition process in these countries. 
A. Econometric Specifications 
The empirical methodology used in this thesis is based 
on the estimation of growth regressions using panel data. The 
data sample covers the period 1990 - 2005 and includes the 3
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following group of 20 transition countries: Albania, Belarus, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia and 
Montenegro, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and the Ukraine. 
Each of these countries is geographically located in Central, 
Eastern. or Southeastern Europe, and began the transition from 
a socialist economy to a market-based system in the early 
1990s. 
This sample utilized panel data, instead of time-series 
data. Unlike time-series data, panel data expand the size of 
the data sample by including more than one country, thus 
increasing the explanatory power of the regression. In doing 
so, the data sample increases substantially and the estimation 
results are therefore better able to explain the causes of the 
economic growth experienced by each country in the region. 
In working with the data sample, the author also used fixed 
effects techniques instead of random effects, allowing for the 
control of certain effects that remain constant over the chosen 
time period. By using random effects, it would have meant 
that there exist events or circumstances which cannot be 
controlled for and could therefore have a substantial impact on 
the economic growth of each country. The possibility that such 
events or circumstances could occur would alter the coefficient 
estimations and significantly decrease the explanatory power of 
the growth regression, and in tum damage the credibility of the 
empirical study. However. the author maintains that this is not 
the case for this data set, and thus utilizes fixed effects. 
For this study, five-year running averages were used, 
instead of simple five year blocks. By incorporating five-year 
running averages into the estimations. the explanatory power 
of the growth regression is enhanced in two ways. First, 
five-year running averages, which cover time periods 1990-
199-+, 1991-1995. 1992-1996, etc .• enable an increase in the 
explanatory power of the regression estimation by maximizing 
the number of observations. With five-year running averages, 
it is possible to include 15 five-year blocks. instead of three, 
which would be the case if the chosen time period were divided 
into three blocks. Second. averaging the data over five-year 
increments helps to eliminate the effects of short-run business 
cycle dynamics on growth. Failure to eliminate the effects 
of such short-run dynamics tends to lead to highly correlated 
time series and to gross overestimation of coefficients (!radian 
2007). 
Following the example of I radian (2007). Fidrmuc (2003 ), 
and Berg et al. ( 1999), the author uses the following growth 
regression model, hereafter called equation I. to construct the 
econometric specifications: 
(1) 
where git• the dependent variable. is the GOP growth rate 
in country i during the time period t. C is composed of a set 
of control variables that are often used in growth literature, 
including the level of development as proxied by initial GOP 
per capita, inflation, the annual population growth rate, the 
total amount of government expenditure, school enrollment 
numbers, total investment, and a measurement of trade 
openness. X is the vector of explanatory variables the author 
wishes to test. These are the variables (including level of 
economic freedom, level of political rights, and level of civil 
liberty) the author uses to test the validity of the interaction 
thesis, and Eit is the specification error term. 
B. Explanation of Variables and Data Sources 
The empirical analysis uses data from a sample of 20 
countries during the period 1990-2005. Values of annual 
population growth rate, real GOP per capita, annual GOP 
growth rate, secondary school enrollment rates, levels 
of investment, inflation, trade openness, and the share of 
government expenditures in GDP are taken from the World 
Bank's World Development Indicators (2007). The values for 
overall economic freedom in each country are extracted from 
the Heritage Foundation's 2006 Index of Economic Freedom, 
and the scores regarding the level of political rights and civil 
liberty for each country are from the Freedom House (2008). 
The first group of variables is a basic set of explanatory 
variables commonly used in growth regression analysis. They 
are used to control for some core components that usually 
drive economic growth in a country. Real GDP per capita is 
used to control for prior levels of development. For example, 
in this analysis, each five-year running average includes the 
beginning year's real GDP per capita level. If the five-year 
average corresponds to the period 1990 - 1994, then the real 
GDP per capita level from 1990 is used in order to see how the 
level of economic development in 1990 affected GDP growth 
over that five year period. Annual population growth rates 
take into account the size of the labor pool in each country. 
The secondary school enrollment rate measures the number 
of people in each country receiving a basic level of education 
and thus is a rough estimate regarding the skill level of the 
country's workforce, while the variable measuring the total 
amount of government expenditure represents the extent to 
which a state's fiscal policy aids or harms its economy. 
By incorporating inflation into the regression, the author 
is controlling for overall levels of macroeconomic stability in 
each of the countries being tested. The level of investment is 
measured by the amount of capital available in each country 
and is used to show the amount of capital or funds earmarked 
for economic investment. Also included in this group of 
control variables is a measure of trade openness, since the 
level of openness in an economy can greatly affect the levels 
of economic growth experienced by that country (Arora and 
Vamvakidis 2004, and Kali et al. 2007). Trade openness is 
calculated as the total value of imports plus exports over 
total GOP (I+EIGDP). The final variable included in each 
five-year running average is the initial level of GOP growth. 
Even though GOP growth serves as the dependent variable, 
preceding levels of GOP growth are believed to directly affect 
later levels of economic growth. Thus, for each five-year 
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running average, the average GOP growth for the previous 
five-year running average was included. 
The second group of variables, including economic 
freedom, political rights, and civil liberties, comprises the 
vector of explanatory variables the author wishes to test. These 
three variables have been chosen in order to test the validity of 
the interaction thesis. By incorporating these three variables 
into the regression specification, the author is able to observe 
how the process of democratization influences levels of GOP 
in the region. More importantly, he can also see whether the 
compatibility or incompatibility of the new formal institutions 
and the informal institutions in each country significantly 
affects and leads to economic growth. The first explanatory 
variable, economic freedom, is included in order to observe 
how the interaction between formal and informal institutions 
in each country affects economic growth over the chosen 
period. As mentioned earlier, the values for this variable are 
taken from the Heritage Foundation's 2006 Index of Economic 
Freedom and are equal to the overall score for economic 
freedom of each country over the period 1990-2005. For 
each country considered, a score is given on a scale of 1 to 5, 
with lower scores translating into higher levels of economic 
freedom. 
Due to its ability to measure the level of government 
participation in the economy, the author chose to incorporate 
the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom into 
the growth regression as a measure of how well a state has 
progressed along the path towards a market-based economy. 
The notion behind this decision is that the lower the score 
a state receives, the better that country has performed in 
its transition to a market-based economy. The new formal 
institutions and rules of a capitalistic economy are in tune 
with the informal institutions already present in that country, 
thus, the new system has been successfully adopted by the 
citizens of that country. Now the question to be answered 
is whether the adoption of a market-based system leads to 
economic growth, and if so then to what extent. By including 
this measure of economic freedom as a variable in the growth 
regression, the author desires to answer this question, and see 
if there exists empirical support for the interaction thesis. 
The final two variables included are political rights and 
civil liberties, and they are meant to measure the effect of 
democratization on economic growth in the region. Each of 
the values for these variables is extracted from the Freedom 
House's annual publication that measures the level of political 
freedom, which it defines as "opportunity to act spontaneously 
in a variety of fields outside the control of government and 
other centers of potential domination"' (Freedom House 2008), 
enjoyed by the citizens of each state throughout the world. 
The organization states that it·· ... does not maintain a culture-
bound view of freedom. The methodology of the survey 
is grounded in basic standards of political rights and civil 
liberties, derived in large measure from relevant portions of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (Freedom House 
2008). 
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These two measures of political freedom were included 
in order to determine whether the democratization process 
occurring in conjunction with the economic transformation 
throughout the region impacts economic growth. Did the 
transition to a democratic system of government affect the 
standard of living in Central and Eastern Europe? Or did the 
process of political liberalization have little effect on the lives 
of individuals in these countries. except that citizens are now 
empowered to choose their own leaders and are better able 
to hold those elected accountable for their actions once in 
power, and to do so without fear of punishment if one's views 
digressed from that of the state apparatus? Inclusion of the 
two measures of political freedom in the growth regression 
provided a mechanism for answering these types of questions. 
C. Empirical Estimation Results 
As mentioned earlier, the author utilizes five-year 
running averages when conducting fixed effects estimations 
of equation. In order to check for robustness, three different 
specifications are run. Each includes the basic set of control 
variables represented by C in the equation, the difference 
among the three specifications being the inclusion of one 
of the three explanatory variables from vector X. The first 
specification includes only the variable measuring civil 
liberties; the second specification incorporates only the 
value that quantifies the level of political rights; and the 
final specification includes only the variable representing 
economic freedom. A specification incorporating all three 
of the explanatory variables the author wished to test is not 
possible due to the high levels of correlation existing between 
the variables. Thus, the author is only able to examine each of 
these variables individually. Additionally, the results presented 
here have been corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's 
correction method. 
Table 1 presents the results of estimating equation (I) for 
each specification. Column 1 presents the estimation results 
for the first specification, which measures the impact of civil 
liberties on economic growth. The results for the second 
specification, which includes the political rights variable, are 
shown in column 2. and column 3 shows the results for the 
third and final specification, which calculates the effect of 
economic freedom on economic growth for the 20 transition 
countries included in study. In addition, located at the bottom 
of each column is the number of observations and the adjusted 
R-squared for the corresponding specification. 
The results of the three specifications provide an 
interesting picture regarding the effects of democratization and 
economic liberalization on economic growth in the transition 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. As one can see, 
the first two specifications generate similar values for the 
coefficients of each control variable. For each of the control 
variables. the impact on the GOP growth rate in each country 
is as expected. The initial levels of GDP growth significantly 
affect later levels of economic growth in a positive manner, 
meaning that the higher the level of economic growth at 
5
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the beginning of the five-year average, the higher the levels 
of growth a country experiences over that five year period. 
Trade openness leads to increases in GDP as does the level of 
investment in each country. As one can see, macroeconomic 
Table l. Dependent Variable: <iDP Growth Rate for each Country 
'rar\O)b1e S~ification 1 S~ification 2 Seedtication 3 
<:i1-·il Liberties and Political Rights and Economic Freedom 
(;rov.th Gro\'\tb and Gru"lo\oth 
llnttial GDP Uro\\th 0.551645* 0.5-UH39"' O.S..J8847* 
(l:;..:'it07>H (!3.44h97) ( 16.03929) 
GDP pn capita -2-l-07336* -2.-U1126* -2.810426* 
1-".7977';9) (-::!.90.)...1.03) (-2.()..l.5954) 
1 Trade- t)pcnne~s 1.253509** 1.567780* 2.011660* 
f:ZS'ShS.-1.1 (2.986::41) (4.105607) 
(Jl)n•mment 0.063396 0.023469 -0.1 ... 3866 .. 
E-..[k'ndtture (1).845368) 10.338747) (-2.513881) 
lme~tment 7.817959* 7.756691* 8.253516* 
17.8-'-6--1.'1 9) 0.435501) (10.20491) 
l lnllalmn -0.002-+tb* -0.002205* -0.006991* 
!-3AIJ795J ( -3.0895-M) (-6.624-1-98) ~ 
1 r~)plllat~nn Gmv.th 0.200332 0.213668 ~0.079532 
10.41077-H (0.441684) (~.183364) 
\ Cn il L1bcny ·0.576(}8-t 
i-1.18H-l99l 
! Po!tw:al R1ght\ 0.291137 
' - (0.857902) 
i E.:onomic Freedom ~2.099691** 
I (·"'.37-l831) 
:\(1_ Ob~cr.attons !52 !52 108 
1 Ad . R --.quarl·d 0.9JfJ75-t 0.937094 0.964658 
Not~s: The symbols * and ** mean that the estimated coefficients are 
significantly different than zero at the I and 5 percent confidence level, 
respectively: !·statistics are in parentheses. 
stability, which is measured by inflation, is necessary in 
achieving economic growth. GDP per capita, as expected, 
possesses a negative effect on economic growth, meaning that 
higher levels of initial GDP or economic development tend to 
slow economic expansion. 
Population growth proves to be insignificant in 
determining levels of output, but this phenomenon could 
arguably be attributed to the fact that the population levels in 
each of these countries did not significantly increase in the 
period 1990-2005. In the first two specifications, overall 
economic growth is not significantly affected by the total 
amount of government expenditure in each country, and the 
etlects of school enrollment levels on GDP growth cannot 
be included in either of the specifications due to the lack of 
observations available. 
In both of these specifications, the level of civil liberties 
or political rights enjoyed by citizens of a country in the region 
proves to be insignificant in determining economic growth. 
although the coefficients for these two variables possess 
different values. According to results for the first specification. 
higher levels of civil liberties lead to greater economic growth, 
while greater political rights adversely affect economic output. 
However. despite this seemingly puzzling outcome. any further 
analysis of these two variables is irrelevant for two reasons. 
First. the estimated coefficients for both of these variables do 
not prove to be significant at either the I or 5 percent level, 
and for the purposes of this thesis the question as to whether 
the process of democratization significantly impacts economic 
grm>th has been answered. Neither the level of civil liberties 
nor the level of political rights in each country appears to have 
influenced economic growth during the period 1990-2005. 
In the third specification, the estimated coefficients of the 
control variables do not alter significantly and the Adjusted 
R-squared increases only slightly from 0.936754 and 0.937094 
to 0.964658, respectively. The only noticeable difference 
among the group of control variables is the finding that the 
total amount of government expenditures becomes significant 
at the 5 percent level. However, the estimated coefficient for 
economic freedom is significant at the 5 percent level. This 
means that, in contrast to the level of civil liberties or political 
rights, the amount of economic freedom enjoyed by the citizens 
of a country does impact economic growth, and as estimated 
by the regression specification it possesses an overall positive 
effect on GDP. In other words, if a country increases its overall 
score for economic freedom by one point, for example from 
3.2 to 2.2, then that country should see its overall economic 
output increase by more than 2 percent. Such a result shows 
not only that greater levels of economic freedom lead to higher 
rates of GDP growth, but in doing so it also provides evidence 
in support of the interaction thesis, since the higher the score 
a country receives from the Heritage Foundation for overall 
economic freedom, the greater that country's economy operates 
according to market principles. Therefore, one can conclude 
that the culture and history, as well as the societal makeup of a 
country, do matter in determining the rate at which a system of 
democratic capitalism is adopted. The more in tune a people's 
culture and their corresponding informal rules are with the new 
formal institutions, the greater the level of economic growth a 
country can expect to experience. 
D. Implications of the Growth Regression Results for the 
Transition Process in Central and Eastern Europe 
Based on the results of the panel growth regression 
described in the previous sections, two points warrant further 
discussion. First, it was estimated that two factors, civil 
liberties and political rights, did not significantly increase 
economic growth for the region of Central and Eastern Europe 
from 1990 through 2005. Proponents of the Chinese model 
or the pluralistic market socialist transition model could 
utilize these results to support their argument that the former 
Communist countries in Europe should not have introduced 
reforms to transform the state politically. especially as these 
countries were transitioning from an economy run by the 
Communist party to one where the market was permitted 
to dictate the amount and types of goods to be produced. 
According to them, it would have been more prudent to follow 
a path of transition similar to that of China and other Asian 
countries or to implement an economic reform plan similar to 
the ''reform socialism" pushed by the Communist governments 
in Europe at various times following World War II. the most 
notable examples being Gorbachev's policies of perestroika 
and glasnost. In both of these scenarios. a single political 
party or entity maintains a tight control over judicial affairs 
while supposedly liberalizing the economy in phases over an 
extended pe1iod of time. 
However. in light of this critique regarding the transition 
process occurring in Central and Eastern Europe. the author 6
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reiterates that such arguments are irrelevant and even erroneous 
for two distinct reasons. In both of the cases mentioned in 
the preceding paragraph, complete economic liberalization 
is usually not the main goal of the government in power. It 
is only lip-service to the outside world. The commanding 
heights of the economy remain in the hands of those holding 
political power, and the individual is still only allowed a 
limited role in determining economic outcomes in a market 
that remains handicapped by the self-interests and overbearing 
presence of the state or those in power. In other words, the 
reforms implemented only go so far. The entire economic 
system will never be transformed completely, because such a 
transition would undermine the interests of the political party 
or individuals who possess complete control over the political 
machinery within the country. 
In addition, proponents of this and similar views fail 
to take into account the circumstances and sentiments 
surrounding the events of 1989 and 1990 in the Eastern bloc. 
According to the regression results, one can state that civil 
liberties and political rights did not significantly impact 
economic growth during the first 15 years of transition, 
yet from the same results one can also infer that these two 
variables did not adversely affect economic growth either 
(Fidrmuc 2003). The people living in the Eastern bloc desired 
both a standard of living similar to that of their neighbors in the 
West as well as a system of government in which they could 
elect their leaders and openly hold views that differed from 
those of the state. If the Communist party was to relinquish 
its control over the commanding heights of the economy. 
then it also would have to give up the reins of political power 
since the two systems were tightly intermeshed. The term 
'·centrally-planned economy'" did not simply describe the 
method by which the economy was managed, because the 
economy was an inseparable part of an authoritarian state 
where the party. governmental, and economic hierarchies 
were tightly intermeshed. with the party and its apparatus 
possessing the dominant voice among the three entities. 
Reforn1s were therefore inevitably blocked at the point where 
any further change in the system of economic management 
might undermine the interests of the party (Kozul-Wright and 
Rayment 1997). Hence. economic reform could not occur 
without political reform and vice-versa; the two processes of 
reform had to occur simultaneously if either one of them was 
to prove successful. 
The second point worth additional commentary is the role 
a people and their informal institutions and rules played and 
continue to play in determining the outcome of the transition 
process in Central and Eastern Europe. The growth regression 
results show that a county's level of economic freedom has 
a significant impact on economic growth. Despite this result. 
though, many economists would agree with Aslund (2002. 75) 
when he states that a country's culture. history, and religion 
had only minimal impact on economic growth in Central and 
Eastern Europe from 1990-2005. especially in comparison to a 
country's economic policy, geography. and levels of investment 
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and technology. However, th1s author strongly disagrees. It 
is true that current levels of development. investment and 
education, as well as previous levels of GDP. have a large 
effect on future rates of growth. However, in order to maintain 
satisfactory levels of investment and economic development, 
a country has to be able to create an environment that 
encourages mdividuals- fore1gn or domestic -to mvest in its 
economy and engage in activity within its borders that creates 
wealth and leads to economic growth. If such an environment 
requ1res certain rules and standards that most politicians and 
economists agree are necessary for mvestment and economic 
growth, then why do some countries still lag behind in the 
transition process? Why are some transition countries unable 
to effectively implement these rules and standards, while 
other states have been able to do so and are now experiencing 
impressive levels of economic expansion? 
As discussed by Friedrich von Hayek ( 1988) and others, 
certain cultures and societal orders are more conducive to 
a market-based economy and a political order rooted in 
the notions of democracy and individual liberties. These 
societies promote self-interest. self-responsibility, and self-
determination; values that reinforce the formal institutions 
-secure property rights. a constitution. an independent 
judiciary, and freedom of contracts- underlying a capitalistic 
system (Colombatto and Macey 1997. Hayek ! 988, and 
Pejovich 1995, 1997, 2003). If a people have had previous 
contact with a societal order that nurtures those or similar 
values. then they will be more inclined to successfully adopt 
a system of government and economics that are based in 
these formal institutions and rules. As a result. transaction 
costs will be minimaL and individuals will be encouraged to 
engage in economic activity, which in turn creates economic 
output and wealth. If not, transaction costs are high, leading 
to situations in which people do not trust the new system and 
revert to what is considered "comfortable" or secure. Special 
interest groups gain control of the political and economic 
system and encourage rent-seeking actions and other behavior 
that undermines the transition process. As a result, the new 
system does not take root and a political and economic 
doldrums emerges. Such is the case in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Countries having prior contact and interaction with 
the West and its values have arguably faired better in the 
transition process. while countries lacking such contact have 
not achieved the same levels of progress as some of their 
neighbors. 
V. Conclusions 
The events of 1989 and 1990 opened a new chapter for 
Central and Eastern Europe. Almost overnight. Communism 
and its ideals lost favor throughout the region. causing 
communist parties to relinquish their control over society 
and a power vacuum to emerge. Elections were held shortly 
thereafter. and although there were varying opinions as to the 
new direction each state should take. the majority of citizens 
throughout the region desired a government modeled on the 
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democratic values of the West and an economic system based 
on the markets, allowing individuals to make consumption 
decisions based on their preferences and for goods to be 
allocated according to the law of supply and demand. These 
preferences represented a clear break from the past. No longer 
would the individual be forced to look to the state for guidance 
in every aspect of one's life. Instead, the people would be able 
to control the political and economic destiny of their countries. 
The past two decades have witnessed the new 
governments in Central and Eastern Europe attempt to steer 
their countries down the long road to political and economic 
transition, reaching varying levels of success along the way. 
Some states have been successful in adopting a democratic, 
pluralistic system of government and a market-based economy, 
while other countries have been unable to achieve similar 
results. Why is this? Why have some countries succeeded and 
others lagged behind? 
Numerous scholars have attempted to answer this question 
over the past 18 years, but they have yet to offer an explanation 
that is applicable to every country undergoing political and 
economic transformation in the region. Among other issues, 
many of these scholars have concentrated on whether or not 
each state should have followed a certain transition model 
when implementing reform measures, or whether enough 
time was spent on institution building at the beginning of the 
reform process. The question remains, why do none of these 
explanations provide convincing evidence as to why certain 
countries have failed and others have succeeded to varying 
degrees? 
This author argues that a core issue is the lack of attention 
given to the interaction of the new formal institutions 
these countries were attempting to adopt and the informal 
institutions already present. Contrary to the presumptions of 
these other scholars, history and culture did play a pivotal 
role in determining whether a country succeeded in adopting 
the new formal rules of democratic capitalism. The West is 
associated with the notion of an extended order society, one 
that encourages the development of the individual and the 
decision-making process that underlies a capitalist system. 
Countries that had prior contact with the West and its notion of 
an extended order society were able to adopt the new formal 
institutions within a relatively short period of time. As a 
result, transaction costs decreased in these states, encouraging 
individuals to engage in the type of voluntary exchanges in the 
marketplace that fuel economic growth. 
On the other hand. countries lacking such a cultural 
exchange with the West have tended to lag behind their 
neighbors in the transition process, unable to adopt certain 
aspects of either a democratic system or a market economy 
or both. Progress in these states has occurred more slowly, 
as individuals have taken longer to adjust to the reforms 
implemented since 1989 and 1990, but such delayed progress 
should not be interpreted as a sign that these countries 
will never succeed in their quest to shed the legacy of the 
communist era. In every transition process, time plays a role. 
As evidenced by the improved scores for overall levels of 
economic freedom awarded by the Heritage Foundation, it 
is possibly only a matter of time before certain states catch 
up with their neighbors in adopting the institutions and rules 
necessary for a properly functioning market economy and 
a political order rooted in the principles of democracy and 
pluralism. 
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Mentor Comments 
David Gay clarifies the scope of the research project from 
which this article was drawn. He leaves no doubt about 
the excellence of the work and the reason that the thesis 
received an Undergraduate Research Award from the Teaching 
Academy. 
This paper is an edited and condensed version of Brian 
Lee's honors thesis which is an exceptionally well-
developed volume of nearly 150 pages. The condensed 
version of the thesis was presellted at the Economics 
Scholars Program at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
in the spring of2008, after a competitive selection process 
involving submissions from students at Texas A&M 
University, Michigan State University, Southern Methodist 
University, the University of Texas at Austin, and others. 
Brian and I met weekly for more than two semesters as 
he crafted the outline and details of his senior honors 
thesis. The topic and approach were primarilv worked ollt 
by Brian Lee. Knowing how well he twanced answers on 
exams from our three courses together, it was clear that his 
literature review arulfocus using his majors in economics, 
German. international relations, and European studies 
would be an epic undertaking. We agreed that a crucial 
element to take his thesis beyond an exemplary rn·iw of 
the works of others was to employ empirical testing of 
the interaction hypothesis and other hypotheses. He was 
aided by Donna Daniels in the University Library, along 
with Proferssor Javier Reyes, who teaches econometrics. 10
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Comparing the usual measures of economic freedom in the 
foreground of economic development during the i990-
2005 period yielded results that put economic freedom in 
the foreground of economic development. The Freedom 
House index did not yield the explanatory power of the 
Heritage Foundation index of economic freedom. in 
addition to this publication in inquiry, I expect that a 
trimmed down version of this paper will be published in a 
high quality economics journal under his sole authorship. 
Brian's thesis was the best that I've seen in 35 years. I 
have seen many great ones, but this has spoiled me (most 
likely,forever). The same theme was echoed by Professor 
Hoyt Purvis in international relations and University 
Professor Murray Smart ("better than many doctoral 
theses"). The topic was compatible with my own imerests, 
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but Brian Lee did the yeoman's dogged work to organi::.e, 
to compare and contrast positiom and hypotheses, and 
to dig out the data to push his honor's thesis beyond the 
realm of being a great thesis into being an extraordinary 
one. i do not expect to see the likes of this quality again 
during what I hope are my next ten years at the university. 
It has he en and likely will remain a highlight of a long 
academic career. 
Brian Lee has received a Fulbright to study in Vienna, 
Austria. He will enroll in the Master of Admnced 
International Studies program at the Vienna School of 
Diplomacy. Under different circumstances. he 11·ould most 
likely have qualified for a Marshall Fellowship hut his 
interests and experiences (both in Austria and as an intern 
with the German Bundestag) led him elsewhere. 
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